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Toward a Fact-Based Analysis of Statutory
Rape Under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines
Susan Fleischmannt
A seventeen-year-old boy is convicted of statutory rape for
sleeping with his long-term, fourteen-year-old girlfriend. Years
pass and he finds himself in federal court on gun possession
charges. The jury convicts him. During his sentencing hearing,
the old statutory rape conviction resurfaces and the judge in-
creases the defendant's sentence because the ancient conviction
for statutory rape indicates that he poses a threat to society.
The term "crime of violence" plays a large role in federal sen-
tencing. The United States Sentencing Guidelines' (the "Guide-
lines") use the term to describe acts which merit enhanced pun-
ishment. Congress promulgated the Guidelines under the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act").2 In response to Congres-
sional concern over the number of crimes committed by released
criminals,3 the Guidelines endorse heightened punishment for
certain dangerous defendants in order to protect the general
community from recidivism.4 However, individual judges retain
the discretion to decide whether statutory rape falls into the
"crime of violence" category. Some judges categorically define
statutory rape as a crime of violence. Others look to the facts be-
hind each case to determine the defendant's dangerousness. Still
others employ an intermediate approach, looking to the facts al-
leged in the statutory rape indictment, but no further. Accord-
ingly, the method judges use to define statutory rape has a great
impact on the future of the defendants before them.
This Comment argues that judges cannot accurately deter-
mine the dangerousness of a convicted statutory rapist without
t A.B. 1994, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Chicago.
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov 1997) ("USSG").
2 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987 (1984), codified at
18 USC § 3551 et seq (1994). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is Chapter II of Title II
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976 (1984),
codified at 18 USC § 3001 et seq (1994).
' Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S Rep No 147 98th Cong 3 (1983), re-
printed in 1984 USSCAN 3185.
4 Id at 50, 1984 USSCAN at 3223.
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closely examining the facts surrounding his statutory rape con-
viction.5 Factors such as the relationship between the two parties
involved in the sexual act, the circumstances under which the act
took place, whether physical injury occurred, and who initiated
the act will inform a conclusion about whether the defendant
poses a threat to the community.6 Categorizing statutory rape as
a crime of violence without scrutinizing the facts underlying the
act can result in enhanced sentences for defendants who pose no
threat to society.
Part I of this Comment examines the methods courts use to
determine whether statutory rape constitutes a crime of violence
for sentencing purposes. It describes the purposes underlying the
Sentencing Guidelines, in particular the Sentencing Commis-
sion's creation of "Career Offender" status and the implications of
that designation for defendants facing sentencing under the
Guidelines. The term "crime of violence" plays a direct role in
assigning career offender status. Part I also discusses how sen-
tencing courts determine whether a past conviction constitutes .a
crime of violence for purposes of enhancing a career offender's
sentence.
Part II of this Comment lays out the different factors that
courts should consider when determining whether an act of statu-
tory rape constitutes a crime of violence. It argues that courts
should look to the nature of the girl's consent to sex, whether she
risked injury, and whether punishing statutory rapists serves the
legislative purpose of protecting community safety. This Com-
ment argues that gauging a defendant's threat to the community
requires close consideration of the particular facts surrounding
his statutory rape conviction before subjecting him to heightened
punishment.
I. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title II of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act, created the United States Sentencing
' This Comment discusses statutory rapists, not child molesters. The boundaries
between these two types of defendants may blur. However, molestation has several dis-
tinct characteristics. For example, pedophiles are commonly relatives of their victims.
See George W. Barnard, et al, eds, The Child Molester 40 (Brunner/Mazel 1989). In addi-
tion, while a strict age cutoff may not determine whether an act of statutory rape is vio-
lent, the ages of the parties can help distinguish molestation from statutory rape.
6 Because this Comment focuses on the dangers associated with teenage pregnancy,
it considers only male defendants who have sex with teenage girls. The issues connected
with same-sex or woman/boy statutory rape are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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Commission,7 "whose duty is to promulgate sentencing guidelines
and policy statements,"' in order to establish a comprehensive
federal sentencing law.' Before passage of the Crime Control Act,
judges and parole commissions had sentencing discretion, a sys-
tem which led to arbitrary and unfair sentences. 10 To eradicate
these problems, Congress established a new procedure under
which federal courts sentence offenders according to the type of
crime they have committed, compounded with their criminal his-
tory.1
1
Although the Guidelines provide a structure to which the
sentencing judge can refer, he retains discretion to depart from
the Guidelines if he so chooses. 2 In considering what sentence to
impose, the judge examines a presentence report that includes
the defendant's criminal history. 3 He then imposes the appro-
priate sentence established by the Guidelines.'4
A. Career Offenders
"Career Offenders" receive enhanced sentences under the
Guidelines. 5 A career offender's criminal record must include "at
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense." 6 The Sentencing Commission de-
fines a "crime of violence" as:
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that... (1)
has as an element the use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a
dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
28 USC § 994(a) (1994).
S Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 63
(1984), reprinted in 1984 USSCAN 3246.
Id at 37, 1984 USSCAN 3220.
Id at 38, 1984 USSCAN 3221.
" See USSG Ch 5, Pt A. For a comprehensive history of the Sentencing Guidelines,
see Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism, 91 NW
U L Rev 1574 (1997).
12 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, S Rep No 98-225 at 78-79, reprinted in 1984
USCCAN 3261-62. See also Whiteside, 91 NW U L Rev at 1590.
USSG § 6Al.1. See also 18 USC §§ 3552, 3553(a)(1) (1994).
" 18 USC § 3553(aX4). For a description of how sentences are calculated under the
Guidelines, see Whiteside, 91 NW U L Rev at 1585-86.
USSG § 4B1.1.
Id at § 4B1.1(3).
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tial risk of physical injury to another. 7
According to the Sentencing Commission, the term "'[c]rime of
violence' includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortion-
ate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling."8 Career of-
fenders should receive a sentence "at or near the maximum term
authorized."9  The career offender category pinpoints those
criminals who pose a high risk of danger to society and thus de-
serve greater punishment."
B. Sentencing Courts Interpreting "Crime of Violence"
Sentencing courts differ on how to determine whether a de-
fendant's past conviction constitutes a crime of violence.2' The
various methods can be grouped into three general approaches:
categorical, intermediate, and fact-based.
Some courts use a "categorical" approach. Under this ap-
proach, courts consider only the nature of the crime committed,
deeming irrelevant all facts surrounding the commission of the
crime.2
2
Other courts use an "intermediate" approach, examining the
record in the prior proceedings to determine whether the defen-
dant has committed a crime of violenceY' In these cases, the
judge considers the indictment or charging document.' If the
indictment contains certain facts, such as the ages of the parties
involved, the court will consider them when making its determi-
nation. However, even if the charging document fails to allege
Id at § 4B1.2(a).
Id at § 4131.2 (Commentary).
28 USC § 994(h) (1994).
United States v Johns, 984 F2d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir 1993) quoting United States v
John, 936 F2d 764, 766-67 n 2 (3d Cir 1991) ("The career offender scheme of using a de-
fendant's criminal record in considering both his offense level and his criminal history
under the Sentencing Guidelines bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose - 'to prevent repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.").
21 See United States v Garcia, 42 F3d 573, 576 (10th Cir 1994) (noting split).
See, for example, United States v Powell, 813 F Supp 903, 909-10 (D Mass 1992).
See, for example, United States v Young, 990 F2d 469, 472 (9th Cir 1993) (review-
ing information in state court proceeding to determine that possession of a deadly weapon
by a prison inmate constituted a crime of violence); United States v Leavitt, 925 F2d 516,
517 (1st Cir 1991) (examining indictment in state court proceeding to determine that
conviction for "High and Aggravated Oral Threatening" constituted crime of violence).
2 The indictment, which replaces the prosecutor's criminal complaint at the trial
stage, is brief. It sets forth the allegation against the accused without an elaboration of
the facts surrounding that allegation. See Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H.
Israel, eds, Modern Criminal Procedure 26, 30 (West 8th ed 1994).
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any use of force, the court may determine that the crime under-
lying a defendant's conviction constitutes a crime of violence.15
Still other courts adopt a "fact-based" approach, extending
their inquiry beyond the record in the prior proceedings to con-
sider the facts surrounding the conviction." Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit encourages elaborate review of the defendant's record in
the sentencing context."
C. Applying the Guidelines to Statutory Rapists
Some courts have used the categorical approach to determine
that statutory rape and other sexual offenses involving minors
constitute crimes of violence.' These courts hold that the risk of
physical force against a minor makes statutory rape inherently
violent.
United States v Bauer" adopted the reasoning of an earlier
child abuse case."0 In Bauer, the court refused to consider the
See United States v Shannon, 110 F3d 382 (7th Cir 1997) (en banc) (holding statu-
tory rape a crime of violence for sentencing purposes); United States v Meader, 118 F3d
876 (1st Cir 1997) (finding prior convictions of statutory rape constitute crimes of violence
for career offender status under the Guidelines). If an indictment included use of force,
defining that act of statutory rape as a crime of violence would be understandable. This
Comment addresses only those situations in which the charging documents do not allege
an element of force and the court refuses to delve into the circumstances behind the act of
statutory rape.
See, for example, United States v Chapple, 942 F2d 439 (7th Cir 1991) (assessing
underlying facts of a state weapons conviction); United States v Flores, 875 F2d 1110, 1112
(5th Cir 1989) (allowing probation officer to testify in current proceeding in order to de-
termine whether prior burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence).
' United States v Coonce, 961 F2d 1268, 1275 (7th Cir 1992) ([A] sentencing judge
can and must consider a defendant's entire history in order that he might make an in-
formed decision as to the proper punishment.").
Sentencing is not the only context in which the categorical approach to statutory
rape presents problems of over-inclusiveness. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1983 (the
"BRA"), codified in 18 USC § 3142 et seq (1984), a judge can deny a defendant pretrial
release from jail if his record contains a conviction for a crime of violence. 18 USC §
3142(e). The legislative history of the BRA does not yield a list of crimes that Congress
envisioned the term "crime of violence" would cover. See Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, S Rep No 98-225 at 3-36 (1984), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 2185-3219. At
least one court has expressed frustration over this omission, stating, "while the govern-
ment must allege that the case involves a crime of violence.... [Tihe absence of a re-
quirement that the judicial officer actually conclude that the crime involved in the case is
one of violence creates a considerable ambiguity." United States v Yeaple, 605 F Supp 85,
87 (M D Pa 1985). According to the statute, even though courts do not have to assess
whether a defendant's past conviction correctly places him in front of them under the
BRA, they must nonetheless decide whether the past conviction indicates a potential for
recidivism, necessitating detention of the defendant. 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A).
990 F2d 373 (8th Cir 1993).
United States v Rodriguez, 979 F2d 138, 141 (8th Cir 1991)
("[T]he elements of the underlying offense need not include use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of force to be considered a 'crime of vio-
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defendant's claim that an act of sexual intercourse was consen-
sual." The court held that the defendant, who had intercourse
with a girl not related to him but under the age of sixteen, had
committed a crime of violence for sentence enhancement purposes
because the act involved a substantial risk of physical harm.32
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit applies the in-
termediate approach to statutory rape. Noting that courts should
not always apply the categorical approach, the Seventh Circuit in
United States v Shannon examined the facts charged in the in-
formation against the defendant." Shannon presents the most
extensive discussion justifying the intermediate approach when
defining statutory rape as a crime of violence.
The defendant, Shannon, was charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm.' Several years earlier, at the age of sev-
enteen, he had been convicted of statutory rape for having sexual
intercourse with a thirteen year old girl.3 The girl became preg-
nant as a result of the act.36 While the indictment did not allege
force,37 the Seventh Circuit found that sexual intercourse with a
girl aged thirteen or younger poses a risk of physical injury great
enough to render the act a per se crime of violence." For the
majority, Judge Posner acknowledged that "a serious risk of
physical injury cannot be automatically inferred from the exis-
tence of a statutory-rape law." 9 However, he distinguished cases
involving sex with prepubescent children or other aggravating
factors." Because Shannon did not include any such factor, Pos-
ner deemed the categorical approach inappropriate.
Nevertheless, Posner declined to consider facts that would
provide a more accurate assessment of the sexual act between
Shannon and the girl, instead opting to apply the intermediate
lence'. . . All crimes which by their nature involve a substantial risk of
physical force share the risk of harm. It matters not one whit whether
the risk ultimately causes actual harm.").
990 F2d at 374.
Id at 375, citing Rodriguez, 979 F2d at 140-41.
110 F3d 382, 387 (7th Cir 1997).
Id at 383.
Id at 384.
Id at 388.
110 F3d at 384. The court based its determination that the defendant did not use
force on the charging document filed against Shannon in the sexual assault charge. How-
ever, the original complaint reveals that Shannon did use force. Id at 391 (Coffey concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part).
Id at 387 (majority opinion).
Id at 386.
40 Id.
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approach.4' Arguing that sex with a thirteen-year-old presents a
risk of physical injury, Posner focused on the idea that thirteen-
year-olds do not know enough about contraception and sexually
transmitted diseases to make an informed, rational choice to have
premarital sex.42 Concluding his opinion, Posner urged the Sen-
tencing Commission to promulgate a concrete definition of statu-
tory rape under the Guidelines, admitting that "[w]e cannot be
certain that we have gotten it right."43
The First Circuit echoed Posner's concern a few months later.
In United States v Meader, the defendant was convicted for dis-
tribution of cocaine, using a firearm in connection with drug traf-
ficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.45 The defen-
dants record contained a conviction for statutory rape of a thir-
teen-year-old girl.46 Basing its decision solely on the age disparity
between the defendant and the girl, the court held that the de-
fendant deserved sentence enhancement because the statutory
rape constituted a crime of violence.47 However, the court noted
that they had "bypassed a number of troubling and complex is-
sues that would need to be addressed before statutory rape at its
most categorical level - i.e., regardless of the conduct charged -
could be classified as a crime of violence for federal sentencing
purposes."8
II. STATUTORY RAPISTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY DANGEROUS
The authority to enhance a defendant's sentence has its roots
in a concern for community safety.49 It is therefore important
that before sentencing defendants, judges correctly ascertain
which defendants actually pose a threat to the community. This
Comment advocates a case-by-case approach to statutory rape
because of the potential over-inclusiveness of the categorical and
intermediate approaches to defining statutory rape.
While deleterious consequences may result from young girls
having sex, punishing statutory rapists to eradicate such conse-
quences does not ensure community safety as Congress and the
110 F3d at 384.
42 Id at 387.
Id at 389.
118 F3d 876 (1st Cir 1997).
Id at 878.
4 Id at 881.
Id at 884.
118 F3d at 884.
See note 20.
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Sentencing Commission intended.
The fact-based approach suits Congress's purpose because it
allows the sentencing judge to more accurately determine
whether a particular defendant truly poses a danger to society.
Under a fact-based approach, courts should consider three as-
pects of an act of statutory rape before imposing an enhanced
sentence. First, applying the Guidelines' definition of crime of
violence and its inclusion of the element of injury, courts should
ask whether the sexual act caused the girl injury. Second, courts
should ascertain whether she consented to the sexual act. Fi-
nally, courts should consider whether the dangers associated with
teen girls having sex, such as the risk of pregnancy and disease,
merit categorizing their sexual partners as societal dangers. This
third prong would not require reconsideration every time a court
confronted a statutory rape conviction. Rather, courts should
establish a fixed policy toward statutory rapists based on a de-
termination of whether teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted
disease are the types of dangers Congress contemplated when
promulgating the Guidelines and the career offender category.
A. Injury
Ascertaining whether physical injury has occurred may help
courts determine whether a defendant constitutes a threat to the
community. In Shannon, Judge Posner's focus on the risk of
physical injury centered on the potential for impregnation or the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases."0 Posner found that the
medical complications of pregnancy and the pain of childbirth are
forms of physical injury.
A thirteen year old is unlikely to have a full appreciation
of the disease and fertility risks of intercourse, an accurate
knowledge of contraceptive and disease-preventive meas-
ures, and the maturity to make a rational comparison of
the costs and benefits of premarital intercourse.... Fur-
thermore, a very young girl who becomes pregnant is quite
likely not to take good care of herself and her fetus, and so
the pregnancy will be more dangerous to both than if she
were older.5'
110 F3d 382 (7th Cir 1997).
5' Id at 387-88. This focus on the physical consequences of teen pregnancy raises the
point that same-sex statutory rape or intercourse between an older woman and a boy does
STATUTORYRAPEANDSFNTENC!NG
Even if Judge Posner's assessment of physical harm is cor-
rect, judges cannot assume that all statutory rape results in teen
pregnancy or venereal disease. 2 If either Shannon or the girl had
successfully used a means of birth control and she had not be-
come pregnant or contracted a sexually transmitted disease, this
sexual act may not have constituted a crime of violence under
Posner's analysis. In order to ascertain whether this injury oc-
curred, the court must look to the facts of the case, rather than
merely at the indictment.
One could argue that for a sex act to constitute a crime of
violence under the Guidelines, it need only pose a slight risk of
pregnancy or disease; the girl need not actually get pregnant, in-
fected, or even substantially risk either outcome. However, pre-
cautions before sex may appreciably cut down these risks.' True,
few teens use contraceptivesM  and even if they did, accidents
sometimes occur.55  Regardless, the information that a couple
used contraception, even if it failed, would indicate that a par-
ticular male may not pose a threat to the general public. Those
males who attempt to avoid impregnating or infecting their part-
ners may not be as dangerous as men who recklessly engage in
unprotected sex with teens, which should mitigate the punish-
ment imposed. Before condemning a defendant for violent crime,
courts should consider the facts of each case in order to determine
whether the defendant risked injuring the girl.
B. Consent
Judge Posner argued, because of her age, the girl in Shannon
could not weigh the risks associated with intercourse adequately
and therefore could not have consented to sex.5 6 Posner may have
focused on age to ascertain whether she consented because of the
difficulty of defining consent in concrete terms. Consensual sex
not involve a similar risk of physical injury: neither of these situations will yield the preg-
nancy of a minor. The older woman may get pregnant, but she is better able to cope with
the consequences of pregnancy according to Posner, and thus is not injured. Of course,
sexually transmitted diseases remain a risk in these relationships.
In 1982, 44 percent of America's sixteen-year-old girls were sexually active. Susan
Moore and Doreen Rosenthal, Sexuality in Adolescence 1 (Routledge 1993). According to
current estimates, 60 percent of unmarried eighteen-year-olds are sexually active, with
younger girls active in lower percentages. Id at 2. In contrast, only one out often women
aged 15-19 becomes pregnant each year in the United States. Id at 145.
' See Peter Bromwich and Tony Parsons, Contraception: The Facts 20 (Oxford 2d ed
1990).
Moore and Rosenthal, Sexuality in Adolescence at 16.
Bromwich and Parsons, Contraception at 139.
110 F3d 382, 387 (7th Cir 1997).
425]
434 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:
implies a lack of physical force." By definition, statutory rape
does not include the element of force included in most rape laws.s
In contrast to rape or sexual assault, both parties ostensibly con-
sent to an act of statutory rape. 9
However, when a girl is particularly young, as was the case
in Shannon, absence of force may not equal consent."° In Shan-
non, Posner held that thirteen-year-old girls cannot rationally
consent because of their immaturity."' Adolescents may make
decisions based on factors such as status, popularity, or the
search for sexual experience. 2 Sexual experimentation may also
' Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape
Laws, 4 Va J Soc Pol & L 287,306 (1997).
See, for example, Ala Code §§ 13A-6-61 (1994) ( "A male commits the crime of rape
in the first degree if: (1) He engages in sexual intercourse with a female by forcible com-
pulsion; or (2) He engages in sexual intercourse with a female who is incapable of consent
by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated"); Idaho Code §§ 18-
6101(2X3) (1997)
("Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or
vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female.
. .[w]here she is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether
temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent or where] she resists but
her resistance is overcome by force or violence.")
In contrast, statutory rape statutes do not include this element of force. See Ala
Code §§ 13A-6-61(3) (1997) ("A male commits the crime of rape in the first degree if... he,
being 16 years or older, engages in sexual intercourse with a female who is less than 12
years old"); Idaho Code §18-6101(1) (Rape occurs "[w~here the female is under the age of
eighteen (18) years"). For a discussion of the difference between force and lack of consent
in the context of rape, see Richard A. Posner and Kathryn B. Silbaugh, Guide to America's
Sex Laws 6-7 (Chicago 1996).
' A court looking back at prior convictions for statutory rape will not, upon finding
that consent did not occur, redefine the sexual act as rape even though statutory rape
implies that consent occurred. Thus, even though the Seventh Circuit found that the girl
in Shannon could not have consented to sex with the defendant due to her age, the court
did not consider the defendant's past act a rape.
' For a discussion of the vague distinction between force and nonconsent in the con-
text of rape law, see Donald Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 Colum L Rev 1780 (1992) (arguing that
legislatures should replace rape law with a variety of statutory offenses that would more
clearly define criminal liability for conduct aimed at causing other individuals to engage in
sexual acts). See also Kitrosser, 4 Va J Soc Pol & L at 307-10 (noting that only eight ju-
risdictions have defined consent and arguing against judicial discretion to imply consent
from non-resistance to force).
110 F3d at 387-88 (7th Cir 1997).
Sharon Thompson, Going All the Way 17-78 (Hill and Wang 1995). Adolescents
are a little-studied group, at least in terms of their social and sexual development.
Thompson compiled hundreds of interviews in which teenage girls discuss their experi-
ences with sex. Using these interviews, Thompson explores the adolescent girl's search for
popularity, status, experience, and love through sexual experience.
In particular, Thompson's book devotes a chapter to adolescent girls pursuing older
men with whom to have sex. Id at 215-44. These girls are looking for experienced teach-
ers with whom to lose their virginity, as well as long-term partners who are more worldly
than the girls' peers. Id at 219-21. Whether they have one-night stands or long-term
STATUTORYRAPEANDS9E1VC!NG
arise from a girl's wish to gain independence from her parents
and begin the process of assuming adult roles.' Courts to whom
these motivating factors seem unimportant may question the le-
gitimacy of her consent:
[A] decision as to what conduct constitutes consent in any
particular context may mask value judgments implicit in
the choice of definition. A determination of sexual consent
may, for example, serve as a proxy for moral judgments
about the behavior of the parties or as a shorthand method
for classifying certain forms of sexual behavior as
normal."4
Therefore, arguing that a girl's lack of maturity renders her
consent to sex illegitimate may make a moral judgment about the
reasons the girl decides to have sex. As Kristin Luker argues,
many people have moral objections to the idea of "casual" sex, yet
regard adolescents as too young to enter serious, long-term sexual
relationships focused on marriage and settling down.' The short-
term sexual relationships Luker considers appropriate for teen-
agers - sex for pleasure, not procreation - "run counter to the
basic values espoused by many adults."6 Thus, if a teen's rela-
tionship rests on short-term goals and pursuit of pleasure, adults
regard her consent to sex as illegitimate.
Larger social factors may influence a girrs decision to have
sex, including family dynamics, or lack of education or
prospects.67 She may seek emotional fulfillment through sex by
convincing herself that she is in love,6 or by having a baby.69 The
defendant who has sex with the girl affected by these pressures is
not culpable; he is merely passively opportunistic, in the right
place at the right time. Indeed, Sharon Thompson's interviews
reveal that many girls play the aggressor in early sexual rela-
tionships, whether they are targeting members of their peer
relationships with these men, the girls come away with heightened self esteem and, in
many cases, knowledge about the risks of unprotected sex that they might not have
learned from their inexperienced male peers. Id at 242-43.
Kitrosser, 4 Va J Soc Pol & L at 323 (cited in note 57).
Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61
S Cal L Rev 777, 795 (1988).
Kristin Luker, Dubious Conceptions: The Politics of Teenage Pregnancy 91 (Har-
vard 1996).
Id.
Moore and Rosenthal, Sexuality in Adolescence at 13-15, 62-80 (cited in note 52).
Thompson, Going all the Way at 17-46 (cited in note 62).
Luker, Dubious Conceptions at 151-54.
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group or considerably older men.7°
True, not all statutory rape defendants will be passive oppor-
tunists. The girl may be vulnerable to seduction because she be-
lieves sex can provide her with certain benefits.7' The defendant
may falsely promise security, love, or status to induce her to sleep
with him. Defendants who fraudulently induce their girlfriends
to have sex with them are certainly reprehensible at some level.
Society may have an interest in keeping these men out of the
community. Yet without assessing the facts behind each sexual
act, a court cannot ascertain whether the defendant induced the
girl to have sex with him, or if it was she who initiated the inter-
course.
A factual inquiry into the nature of the relationship might
determine the legitimacy of the girrs consent. Proof of contracep-
tive use could indicate the girl was mature enough to recognize
the consequences of premarital sex. If the two individuals had
consistently used contraception over the course of a long-term
sexual relationship, the male may not be likely to impregnate
many girls in the community.
Of course, one could argue that use of contraceptives does not
prove mature decisionmaking. Contraceptives do fail.72  Dis-
counting failure rates may indicate a girl's immaturity. Perhaps
a court could evaluate contraceptive use on a sliding scale, com-
pounding risk of failure with age and its relative dangers of preg-
nancy to ascertain maturity. Under that analysis, many adults
might be considered immature. Regardless, courts that choose to
discount a girl's ability to make rational decisions based on her
age must confront the feminist argument that statutory rape
laws repress female sexuality. True, courts may not be corn-
Thompson, Going all the Way at 217 (cited in note 62).
7' See Elizabeth Rice Allgeier and Betty J. Turner Royster, New Approaches to Dating
and Sexuality, in Elizabeth Grauerholz and Mary Koralewski, eds, Sexual Coercion 133,
135-38 (Lexington 1991) (discussing the roles that power and desire play in adolescent
courtship).
See note 55.
See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statu-
tory Rape Law, 85 J Crim L & Criminol 15, 28-29 (1994). See also Frances Olsen, Statu-
tory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex L Rev 387 (1984) (examining the
tension between statutory rape laws that protect women from oppressive male sexuality
while restricting women's sexual freedom, that is, their ability to choose when to have
sex). Some feminists argue that statutory rape laws impinge upon a young woman's
autonomy because she cannot legally choose when to become sexually active. Historically,
statutory rape laws protected the chastity of women, considering their virginity a thing of
value requiring protection to increase their chances of marriage. Oberman, 85 J Crim L &
Criminol at 24-25. Feminists argue that these laws, which protect a girl's worth as an
object, damage her ability to achieve status equal to that of men in modern society. Olsen,
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pelled by any argument advocating the autonomy of young girls
and the importance of their development as sexual beings. Yet
the legislative trend toward gender-neutral statutory rape laws74
indicates that a woman's legal status is growing in importance
relative to a man's.
C. Social Threat
Although historically statutory rape has not been prosecuted
at a high rate,75 Posner's focus on pregnancy may reflect the legal
community's growing tendency to treat statutory rape seriously
to combat high national teen pregnancy rates.76 Nationally, 110.8
teens per thousand get pregnant every year.77 In response to
these numbers, states have begun to aggressively enforce laws
which ban sex with minors.7" For instance, in the past two years,
California, Delaware, Florida and Georgia have passed new leg-
islation strengthening existing laws prohibiting sex with girls
under the age of consent.79 California has allocated $8.4 million
to prosecute adult men who have sex with underage girls, with
prosecutors focusing on cases in which pregnancy occurs involv-
ing a mother aged fifteen or younger and a father over twenty-
one.8
While the legislative history of the Guidelines does not men-
tion statutory rape or teenage pregnancy,8 ' these recently enacted
state laws may indicate legislative response to a societal concep-
tion that teenage pregnancy is "dangerous." However, it is not
clear that sex causes the type of danger the Guidelines should
combat. As Luker points out:
Although poverty alone is a strong predictor of early child-
bearing, teenage parents, compared with people who don't
63 Tex L Rev at 406.
" See Oberman, 85 J Crim L & Criminol at 32 (cited in note 73).
Id at 16.
Indeed, despite his assertion that he would not consider the facts behind Shannon's
act, Posner did note the fact that Shannon, who is 17, had fathered five other children, at
least one the product of statutory rape. See Shannon, 110 F3d 382, 388 (7th Cir 1997).
Luker, Dubious Conceptions at 197 (cited in note 65).
Catherine Elton, Jail Baiting: Statutory Rape's Dubious Comeback, New Republic
12 (Oct 20, 1997).
70 Id.
Gwen Daye Richardson, Girls Without Fathers, 8 Headway N 6 (Sept 30, 1996).
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S Rep No 98-225 at 117, 176 (1984)
reprinted in 1984 USSCAN 3300, 3359. The legislative history concentrates on the dan-
gers associated with drug offenses and violent crimes, but does not mention statutory rape
or pregnancy as falling into these "dangerous" categories.
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become parents as teens, are much more likely to have
many other problems in their lives even before they get
pregnant: they are more likely to come from a single-
parent family, to have trouble in school, to have been held
back a grade, to come from a home that has been broken
by divorce or separation, and to live in bad
neighborhoods.82
Instead of enacting laws that incarcerate the men who get these
girls pregnant, legislatures would better serve society by focusing
on the problems that make these teens more likely to have unpro-
tected sex.'
In addition, programs like California's, which attempt to chill
sex between older men and younger women, may not eradicate
teenage pregnancy because girls will have sex with boys closer to
their own age." In the United States, about 60 percent of unmar-
ried eighteen-year-olds are sexually active, and many began ex-
perimenting with sex at an earlier age.' At least one state court
has described the sexual activity of minors as a "serious prob-
lem," meriting a holding that prohibits such activity." However,
focusing on relationships between older men and young girls in
the attempt to eradicate teen pregnancy is misinformed. The
majority of girls having babies are eighteen or nineteen years old,
not fifteen.87 Further, girls who have sex with older men are
more likely to use contraceptives than those who have sex with
their peers.8
No one can deny that poverty and other social ills are linked
with teenage pregnancy.89 Motherhood compromises a girls edu-
Luker, Dubious Conceptions at 113 (cited in note 65).
Indeed, if courts and prosecutors cracking down on statutory rape wish to elimi-
nate the problems affiliated with teenage pregnancy, they should not incarcerate statutory
rape defendants who have impregnated their partners. While felons do not make the most
desirable fathers, at least while out of prison these men can provide for their children. For
a discussion of the typical problems faced by single teenage mothers, see Luker, Dubious
Conceptions at 110 (cited in note 65).
8 Although girls often do choose older men as their first sexual partners, the average
age of girls' sexual partners is nineteen. See Thompson, Going all the Way at 217 n 5
(cited in note 62). To an extent, teen girls' sexual partners are fungible. Id at 71.
Kitrosser, 4 VAJ Soc Pol & L at 322 (cited in note 57).
' State v J. A S., 686 S2d 1366, 1369 (D Fla 1997).
' Luker, Dubious Conceptions at 8, 207 n 20 (cited in note 65) (citing data from Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics, 43(5) Advance Report of Final Natality Statistics 33
(1992) (Supp Oct 25, 1994)). See also Elton, Jail Baiting at 12 (cited in note 78).
Thompson, Going all the Way at 238 (cited in note 62).
' Luker, Dubious Conceptions at 110 (cited in note 65).
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cational options and her chances for success in lifeY0 Yet it is not
clear that the real solution for decreasing the rate at which teen-
age girls get pregnant is a broad attack on the men and boys who
have sex with them.
Under the Guidelines, a pertinent conviction for statutory
rape could have occurred years prior to the felony for which the
defendant faces sentencing. Unless the defendant's record shows
a pattern of statutory rape or a string of illegitimate children
with teenage mothers, punishing him more severely will do little
to protect society. In order to correctly assess which convicted
statutory rapists pose a legitimate threat to society, the court
should consider all of the facts underlying the statutory rape be-
fore classifying it as a crime of violence. The court should inves-
tigate whether the defendant and the girl were in a long-term
monogamous relationship or whether the defendant was having
random sex with many different girls at the time of his convic-
tion. Courts should weigh evidence regarding either party's use
of contraceptives, including whether the method used protects
against sexually transmitted disease. Ultimately, the court's de-
termination of a particular defendant's dangerousness rests on a
myriad of considerations that it should examine each time it ad-
dresses a statutory rape case.
CONCLUSION
Congress promulgated the Sentencing Guidelines to protect
society from the recidivism of convicted felons. Under the Guide-
lines, courts must determine whether a defendant deserves en-
hanced punishment because his prior conviction for statutory
rape indicates that he poses a threat to society. While some
statutory rape does threaten societal well-being, courts cannot
determine whether a defendant poses any danger without fully
examining all of the facts underlying his prior conviction. Thus,
in order to avoid gratuitously punishing defendants, courts
should use a fact-based, rather than a categorical or intermedi-
ate, approach to determine whether statutory rape constitutes a
crime of violence.
' Id at 111.
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